face existential threats by rising sea levels). 9 In this respect, we shall be avoiding the term international community and shall be utilizing references to inter-State cooperation.
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6 The 1992 UNFCCC and its 1997 Kyoto Protocol may have laid the foundations for a nighuniversal climate change mitigation regime that is predicated, amongst others, on the principle of equity (see Article 3.1 UNFCCC) that differentiates the climate change mitigation duties owed by the industrialized States from those owed by less-and least-developed States, according to their emitting history and their current capabilities. The UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol are significant multilateral steps for the cause of environmental protection; however, in the grander scheme of things, they may have been of little consequence. We say this as we are astonished to note that, while the strength of the Kyoto Protocol lies in the fact that 191 out of 192 of its parties have ratified it (with the notable exception of the US), its Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (pursuant to Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol) has only resulted in a 1% containment of global CO2 levels. See Goldthau, A. and Witte, J.M. (eds.) Global Energy Governance: The New Rules of the Game, (Brookings Institution Press, 2010, at p. 146). 7 We shall be referring to fossil fuel/hydrocarbonrgy sources throughout the present chapter. 8 See www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/sid/list.htm. 9 For a call to change the current approach to climate change mitigation and to suggest that major economies be more active in the fight against climate change, see Leal 
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We see some instances of unilateralism with respect to measures taken on the basis of the need to address climate change; however, these are not enough.
TS) is a case in point,
where an economic area namely the EU that is also a WTO member in its own right had unilaterally, and much to the ire of several other States and WTO peers, 10 sought to include within its ETS all commercial aviation industry actors whose flight operations engaged EU territory. The EU finally suspended this policy under the pressure of the reaction that ensued, which could be seen as EU deference towards multilateralism 11 . Unsurprisingly, the EU had argued that such instances of unilateralism were necessary, if not justified, given the urgency that climate change caused and given the rather inadequate efforts of the international through its various relevant organizations, including the International Civil Aviation Organization 12 .
Having accepted that the threat of irreversible environmental degradation is real rather than imagined, and having understood that the political realities of inter-State cooperation namely, the disparity of interests at play are, to say the least, partly to blame for the lack of meaningful inter-State action, it seems reasonable to expect that measures be they unilateral or collective aimed at climate change mitigation and adaptation ought to be systemically encouraged and supported. Such measures may be schemes at the domestic, regional, and/or interState levels aimed at promoting the development and use of energy sources that 12 On this issue, see http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation/index_en.htm, where it is stated that the EU had been pressing ICAO for more than 15 years to take meaningful action in relation to GHG emissions. Also at the same link, read the official EU narrative on this issue. The EU holds to the view, further to a December 2011 Court of Justice of the European Union case brought by some US airlines, that the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS is compatible with the -366/10). Diversifying the global energy supply mix in a manner that increasingly draws from renewable sources could have far-reaching geo-economic and geostrategic implications, 15 including: the containment of GHG emissions to levels that would avert more costly future redress; the conservation of ecosystems and safeguarding the human, animal, and plant populations they sustain; more enhanced energy security for those States and groups of States that are net energy importers; and foreign relations that are less skewed by energy considerations. The scope of this chapter relates to the implications of renewable energy for the environment, and how, therefore, measures taken to promote the development and In our view, certain energy sources that are more environmentally friendly due to their lower CO2 emissions when compared with fossil fuels namely, biomass/biofuels are rightly considered non-conventional energy sources. That said, given that they are produced by processing mainly plants that need to be replanted, strictly speaking, these sources are not renewable in the way that wind, solar, hydro, and geothermal are renewable. Despite this, we have also followed the practice of the IEA and IRENA to aggregate these too as renewables. 
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16 A similar line of thought is to be found in LealCarbon and Climate Law Rev, Vol. 7(1), pp. 34-42, 2013 (discussing how to promote climate change mitigation by using preferential trade agreements). 17 While the WTO and its norms apply to intra-WTO trade, they may also have implications for trade flows involving a nexus between States where at least one party is a WTO member. For instance, the requirement under Article I GATT (regarding the principle that WTO members ought -privilege that a WTO member affords to any other State must, in effect, be unconditionally extended to all of its WTO peers. Naturally, this does not create obligations for non-WTO members. 18 After the introduction, for context purposes, we shall briefly refer to some general global energy data and to some data that are more specific to renewable energy in Section II. In Section III, we shall sum up arguments in relation to the suitability of the existing multilateral system to sufficiently balance the inter-State The latest readily available global data compiled by the International Energy Agency (IEA) indicate that renewable energy sources made up 13.2% of the global energy supply mix in 2010, while conventional energy sources (oil, In recent years, there has been an increase in subsidies directed at the promotion of renewable energy. The global figures for subsidies in the renewable http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/162166/, reporting proceedings from a workshop held at the WTO Headquarters in Geneva, where several attendees commented on the need for the WTO system to better accommodate the promotion of renewables and energy particularities. We would add that such statements generally support the misperception that the current normative framework may be woefully inadequate. While we believe that guidelines based on the WTO rules and jurisprudence would be helpful to WTO members imaginably, these could be drafted by the Environment, and any other relevant WTO organ the rules and jurisprudence, as they currently stand, do not obstruct measures taken to promote renewable energy, so long as such measures are, generally, bona fide, not unduly discriminatory, and not unduly restrictive. It is therefore one thing to call for far-reaching through, e.g., guidelines and clarifications systemic encouragement of the scalingup and taking-up of renewables, and quite another to attempt to do away with the existing safeguards in WTO rules and jurisprudence that seek to prevent abuse (e.g., discriminatory treatment and/or protectionism). 40 
terms of reference. Annexes to this Agreement specify which the covered agreements are. The GATT is the principal multilateral trade agreement under the WTO concerning tradable goods. See the former binding upon the entire WTO membership, while the normative effect of the latter set relies on WTO members having specifically acceded to this class of international agreements. The entire WTO system is predicated on the core principle of non-discrimination by prohibiting discrimination along the following two axes: among WTO peers (Article I of the GATT) and among domestic and imported tradables (Article III of the GATT). Certain trade-distortive measures argued to have been taken to promote renewables may, and often do, engage any, or both, of these twin aspects of the non-discrimination principle. 42 Currently there are 41 parties to the GPA, including all 28 EU members (with the Netherlands in its own right and on account of Aruba). Note that the EU is not a party in its own right to the GPA. (See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm#pArt ies). 43 In terms of the diverse typology of policy tools to promote renewables, see Ghosh, Arunabha and produced goods. Such a measure would, on its face, be offending a principal tenet of the WTO system that like products, once over the border, be treated in a nondiscriminatory manner, irrespective of whether they are imports or domesticallyproduced. 45 Such measures are unlikely to be permitted under the general exceptions (cf., Article XX of the GATT), given that, should imported goods do as good a job as those domestically sourced, the consequent discrimination may actually be mercantilist protectionism veiled by environmental protection pretexts. 
relevant cases elsewhere in this chapter. What is more, it is worth noting that the chapeau to Article XX conditions the application of the general exceptions to ensure that it is not used to offer protection to domestic industry or to discriminate between trade partners. Thus, the chapeau reiterates the non-discriminatory dual principle upon which the WTO system is predicated, namely Article I (most-favored nation treatment) and Article III (national treatment) of the GATT. 47 What is more, in the US-Gasoline case, in finding against the US measure and thus disallowing its justification under Article XX(g), the Appellate Body clearly felt the need to reiterate that the specific finding does not compromise in any way the autonomy of WTO members to take environmental protection 72 What is more, the TBT Agreement systemically defers to the SPS Agreement for measures that may more appropriately fall within the 
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All the above developments point towards a multilateral trade system that has evolved to its current WTO form to better and more meaningfully integrate non-core objectives e.g., environmental protection with its core trade liberalization objectives. And towards a system that affords, if not preserves, the necessary policy space for WTO members to continue to pursue a wider range of policy objectives, including those linked to environmental protection. 
non-exhaustive, open list of complaining Member bears the burden of proving that the is not legitimate. The practical effect of this difference is that some policy objectives that would not be permissible to justify a prima facie GATT breach through GATT Article XX will be admitted under TBT Article 2.2 as legitimate objectives capable of justifying technical regulations that create obstacles to trade. Already in the US COOL dispute [i.e., United States Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, (WT/DS384/DS386)], an objective that would most probably not have come within any of the subparagraphs of GATT Article XX the US objective of providing consumers with information on the countries in which the livestock from which the meat they purchase is produced were born, raised, and slaughtered, was considered legitimate for the purposes of TBT Article 2.2.
Latin American Journal of International Trade Law, Vol. 1, Issue 1, 2013 (at p. 311). 75 See Article 8.2(c) of the SCM Agreement, which lays down the conditions for non-actionable subsidies, including that the environmental protection levels an existing facility seeks to meet be prescribed by law and that the subsidy not exceed 20% of the total cost of adaptation. 76 See Article 8.2(a) of the SCM Agreement in relation to the conditions that emphasize the need for the benefit of any such subsidy to accrue to the beneficiary during the pre-competitive stage. 77 See Article 31 of the SCM Agreement, which states that the provisions of Article 8 of the SCM Agreement, amongst others, shall apply not more than five years after the date that the Agreement on the Establishment of the WTO comes into force. 
There is a wealth of cases that contain findings that, in effect, regulate reliance on Article XX. For the purposes of this chapter, however, we are not drilling down to such level in this subsection, as we are mainly concerned with presenting aspects of the WTO system that are amenable to environmental protection objectives. Such cases are aspects of the US-Gasoline, which articulates the relationship between the measure and the policy objective it seeks to advance (the means and 80 Note that the wording between groups of Article XX grounds (namely, the use of "necessary" in paragraphs (a), (b) and (d); "relating to" in paragraphs (c), (e) and (g); "in pursuance of" in paragraph (h); "essential" in paragraph (j); "for the protection of" in paragraph (f); and "involving" in paragraph (i)) varies, which suggests that its effect on the required degree of relationship between the objective behind the trade-restrictive measure and the measure taken may vary. See the US-Gasoline dispute, where it refers to the significance of textual nuances (at pp. 17-19). 81 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/climate_change_e.pdf for a WTO take on the intersection between the WTO system and climate change. The production of electricity through renewable means is less regular than through the combustion of hydrocarbons or through nuclear fission. Energy production through the harnessing of, say, solar and wind power is contingent upon weather conditions. There can be no steady production outside the vagaries of the weather. What is more, the cost of the necessary infrastructure makes this field of the renewables industry uncompetitive when compared with conventional energy production. 89 The short of it in relation to these cases is that the Appellate Body having upheld some and having nullified other earlier findings by the Panel ended up recommending that Canada abandon the LCR component of its measure as it found this to be, amongst other things, an unjustifiable breach of Article III of the GATT in relation to the non-discrimination principle that imported products be treated similarly to like -discrimination principle that underpins the multilateral trade system).
The complainants had sought to have the measure examined primarily under the specific provisions in the SCM and TRIMs Agreements as they considered these to be the lex specialis applicable to the measure in question. Article III of the GATT prohibits discriminatory treatment of imports vis-à-vis
As stated earlier, the GPA is a plurilateral agreement annexed to the Agreement Establishing the WTO. Canada and Japan are parties to the GPA. The EU is listed as a party , which suggests it is not a party in its own right. See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm. In any event, the GPA has been cited in the Appellate Body report in side comments (pp. 50 & 58). 88 The TRIMs Agreement is also an Annex 1A (to the Agreement Establishing the WTO) covered multilateral agreement and, therefore, binding on all WTO members. 89 See §5.174 (at p. 124) of the Appellate Body joint report. 90 Readily we see the prohibition of any subsidy that seeks to boost exports or substitute imports. ! ! AN! domestic products 91 and prohibits the use of LCRs, 92 it permits derogation in relation to government procurement 93 so long as there is no subsequent commercial dimension to this procurement. 94 The Appellate Body rejected the argument that both of these instruments were somehow more specific to the measure and considered that the measure could appropriately be examined under Article III of the GATT. Also, the Appellate Body rejected the view that, when confronted with claims engaging all three instruments (namely the GATT, the SCM and TRIMs Agreements), it ought take into consideration and examine these in a sequence that promoted the last two. China. 100 The US contended, amongst other things, that such measures appeared to be contingent upon the use of domestically produced goods and, therefore,
This section refers to other renewable energy-related complaints that have engaged the WTO dispute settlement processes; however, not all cases necessarily resulted in determinations. 99 WT/DS419. China also challenged the US Department of Commerce presumption that 
124 This is despite an earlier (nota bene: the report was circulated in March 2011) Appellate Body determination in a case brought by China against the US, where the Appellate Body reversed the Panel's interpretation of the term "public body" in Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement and found that a public body is an entity that possesses, exercises, or is vested with, governmental authority, and where it found that the US had acted inconsistently with Articles 1.1(a)(1), 10, and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement, in finding that certain State-owned enterprises constituted public bodies. employed by a WTO member that leads to less favorable treatment for imports.
As we have stated, the above listed disputes, for the most part, are at the early stages of the dispute resolution process. However, there is WTO jurisprudence that, although not directly concerned with renewables, has implications for renewables within the WTO. Potentially, an importer of electricity may argue that the higher tariffs paid to, or preferential price levels set by government for, renewable-energy domestic producers breach Article III of the GATT. Here there is a series of questions that would have to be addressed. For instance, are the electricity imports, which are alleged to be treated less favorably, like products for the purposes of Article III of (fossil fuel), nuclear, or renewables) a like product their production method may well make these sufficiently unlike.
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It is worth noting that, in the Canada cases, the Appellate Body albeit for the purposes of assessing what might be the appropriate market benchmark for an assessm of the SCM Agreement contemplated the differences between the electricity generation industries drawing from conventional sources and those drawing from renewables as being rather distinct. 143 In that respect, less favorable treatment towards electricity produced by conventional or nuclear means and that of electricity produced by renewables may be entirely justified under WTO rules if they are determined to be unlike, so long as domestically produced electricity derived by conventional or nuclear means is also treated in an even-handed manner. Otherwise, the complaint by foreign electricity producers could be structured on the less favorable treatment accorded to those like products namely, imported electricity produced by conventional or nuclear means vis-à-vis domestically produced electricity produced by conventional or nuclear means, given that discriminatory treatment could then be said to exist between like products.
Other issues that appear repeatedly in the renewables-related complaints we have listed earlier relate to whether a particular measure actually amounts to a prohibited or otherwise actionable subsidy within the context of the SCM Agreement. Again, making such a determination relies on a thorough review of all relevant aspects of a measure. Does the measure involve some sort of material support on the part of a government to its domestic industry in a manner that is trade-distortive? In that sense, government or public body (or even a private body where it is clear or imputed that it exercises some government-like functions 144 ) and pecific meaning within the SCM Agreement; The main barriers to the scaling-up and proliferation of renewables relate to the infrastructural costs that make energy production uncompetitive when compared with energy production based on conventional energy sources. This is a barrier that is certainly compounded by the long-standing subsidization of conventional energy sources. What is more, conventional energy source-related subsidies amounting to up to 90% of energy subsidies which, incidentally, negatively impact the ecosystem, are actually tolerated within the WTO system.
Predictably, these are unlikely to be addressed in WTO litigation, given that these are popular measures among States, but also because demand for conventional energy sources exists to a large extent due to the distortive effects of such subsidization. For instance, if there were fewer conventional energy subsidies, at best, renewable energy may have been more competitive and therefore more viable; however, at worst, perhaps a larger part of the human population would have been denied access to affordable energy and would have been condemned to pre-modern standards of life. hidden behind these), their adverse effects, and the specific WTO rules that are engaged.
155
As we have attempted to outline in this chapter, the policy space appears to be preserved for WTO members to take measures to support environmental goals, including the promotion of renewables. This is particularly the case in the WTO era. Rather than finding fault with the existing normative framework of the multilateral trade system in relation to the further development and proliferation of renewables, we believe the obstacles to the promotion of renewables do not flow from some normative failure, but from the economics that underlie energy. 154 See Articles III, IV, IX, and X of the Agreement Establishing the WTO, which relate to the competences of the Ministerial Conference. The Ministerial Conference may either consensually or on the basis of a three-fourths majority -whichever may be required under the specific requirements of these provisions adopt amendments to the agreements or interpretations of terms within the agreements. 155 In fact, an excellent example, albeit one that considers these from a subsidies point of view, appears in Ghosh, A. Governing Clean Energy Subsidies: What, Why International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (at p. 41).
